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COMMENT
CHANDLER V. MILLER: No TURNING BACK FROM A
FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court excludes the practice of random, suspicionless
drug testing from Fourth Amendment protection in certain circum-
stances. By allowing the government to conduct such testing, has the
Court gone so far as to violate the basic protections guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment?' A survey of criticism leveled at the Court for its
application of the Fourth Amendment may indeed lead to the alarming
conclusion that the Court is in fact a pack of lawbreakers.2
This Comment contends that the Court has committed no crime in
applying the Fourth Amendment in non-traditional ways to new and
changing circumstances, such as the growing problem of illegal drug use.
It shows how the Court's actions reflect a legitimate process of constitu-
tional maturation and evolution. This Comment defends the premise that
change, even in the understanding and application of core tenets of the
law, is natural and necessary.
Such a recognition of the mutability of law opens the door to a
broader scope for searches and seizures than the Court has traditionally
allowed under the Fourth Amendment. This broader scope allows urine
testing of whole classes of persons for the use of illegal drugs without
individualized suspicion, a major departure from the traditional require-
ment for a legal search. The Court has sanctioned these tests by employ-
ing a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard in place of the prob-
able cause standard.3
The Court's decision in Chandler v. Miller," taken together with the
cases leading up to Chandler in which the Court endorsed government-
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wan-ants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Joaquin G. Padilla, Comment, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: Flushing the
Fourth Amendment-Student Athletes' Privacy Interests Down the Drain, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 571
(1996) (asserting that the Court sanctioned illegal government action by holding as constitutional
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes).
3. See infra notes 7-35 and accompanying text.
4. 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (finding that suspicionless drug testing of candidates for
state offices violated Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches).
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ordered suspicionless drug searches,' offers a framework in which to
analyze the Court's development of a Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard. Accordingly, Part I of this Comment describes the development
of Fourth Amendment analysis leading up to Chandler, including a com-
parison of the conjunctive and disjunctive approaches to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, and presents some of the criticism of the Court's current
interpretation of the amendment. Part II outlines the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Chandler. Part Ill critiques the formalist philosophi-
cal basis for a conjunctive reading of the amendment, and offers a prag-
matist proposal for a two-tier application of Fourth Amendment probable
cause and reasonableness standards.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution from Probable Cause to Reasonableness
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures6 conducted by the government or its
agents. In Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced that the Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places." In so
defining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, the Court moved
the amendment's applicability beyond the trespass and property contexts'
in which the Court traditionally applied it."° After Katz, the question of
whether a person is entitled to protection became not whether the gov-
5. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) (allowing
suspicionless drug testing of middle school and high school athletes); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (allowing suspicionless drug testing of certain classes
of United States Customs Service agents); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 633-34 (1989) (allowing suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees).
6. The Fourth Amendment extends an individual's right to security from unreasonable search
to "persons, houses, papers, and effects .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614; see also United States v. McGreevy, 652 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that searches conducted without governmental assistance or encouragement do not
come within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection).
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In Katz, federal agents used an electronic
device to listen to a telephone call a criminal suspect made from a public telephone booth. Id. at 348.
The agents acted without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 354-56. The Court held that a conversation
from a public telephone booth is constitutionally protected from warrantless search and seizure,
rejecting the government's argument that protection was not required, because agents did not
physically enter into the area occupied by the petitioner. Id. at 358-59 (citing Katz v. United States,
367 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966)).
9. Id. at 353 (stating that the trespass doctrine controlling the governmental right of search
and seizure has been "discredited" and "eroded"); see also William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy,
and the Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 633, 633-34 (1994) (noting that Fourth Amendment
protections derive in part from eighteenth century British precedents which limit the government's
right to seize a person's property, and especially one's papers).
10. The "person, not place" standard has been criticized for removing the scope of protection
from its traditional, physically defined boundaries. For an example of such criticism, see Morgan
Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV.
199 (1993). Cloud criticizes the Court for replacing the established property rights theory with an
"an ambiguous formula" which is too subjective to be workable. Id. at 249.
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enment intruded upon a citizen's property, but whether the citizen had a
reasonable expectation of privacy."
The Katz privacy standard was vague, providing no definitive guid-
ance to lower courts regarding the scope of its application.'" In his con-
currence, however, Justice Harlan suggested a means to correct the
vagueness. Justice Harlan introduced a two-prong test to determine the
legality of a search or seizure under the Court's "person, not place" in-
terpretation of the amendment." To satisfy Harlan's test, a defendant
must first show an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" and, sec-
ond, the defendant must then show that the expectation is "one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.""' Subsequently, the Court
adopted Harlan's formulation."
Once a court determines that a search occurred within the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection, it must determine whether that search
was reasonable.'6 Historically, the Court considered searches conducted
without warrants issued upon probable cause unreasonable per se.'7 In
recent years, however, the Court has backed away from a strict warrant
requirement.8 The Court has identified so many exceptions'9 that critics
11. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
12. See Cloud, supra note 10, at 249.
13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
14. Id. at 361. The second prong of the test has become increasingly important, focusing the
analysis on society's view of what constitutes the reasonable scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. Paul R. Joseph, Fourth Amendment Implications of Public Sector Work Place Drug
Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 605,618 (1987).
15. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (defining a search as an action
touching on "an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable"); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding warrantless aerial search of fenced-in yard to be legal);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding constitutional a warrantless registry of all
telephone numbers dialed from petitioner's home).
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
17. Id. at 357; see also Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473,479 (1991) (stating that "under present
law, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the search falls into an exception").
18. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995) (stating that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness generally requires judicial issuance of a warrant); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (stating that generally a legal search must
be supported by warrants issued upon probable cause); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (stating that in criminal cases, a search or seizure is unreasonable unless
performed pursuant to a warrant, except where cases involve "special needs").
19. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-41, 544 (1985)
(holding border searches beyond scope of typical customs search valid where customs agents
reasonably suspect smuggled contraband); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983)
(discussing police inventory procedures associated with incarceration); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 553-55 (1980) (stating that a person is not "seized" due to inoffensive contact with
police unless "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave"); United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (involving administrative searches of closely regulated
businesses); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (declaring that where police officers have
reasonable basis to fear for their own or others' safety they are entitled to search person's outer
clothing for purpose of recovering weapons); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967)
(excepting situations where police officers pursue a suspect and delay would endanger lives).
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contend the exceptions have swallowed the rule." While announcing the
applicability of the probable cause standard in all cases implicating the
Fourth Amendment, the Court in effect has developed a standard of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness parallel to the probable cause stan-
dard.2'
The Court severed the probable cause standard from a reasonable-
ness standard in Terry v. Ohio,22 where the Court held that evidence
found by a policeman acting without a warrant or probable cause in a
"stop and frisk" search was admissible at trial.23 The Court thus intro-
duced the standard of reasonable suspicion," a lower standard than prob-
able cause.' In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court
required that a law enforcement officer must show only that he based a
search on facts reasonably sufficient to warrant the search.26 The Court
adopted a test the Court first employed in an administrative context." The
test mandates balancing the government's need for a search or seizure
with the level of intrusion the action imposed.28 The Court stated that,
outside the context of a search pursuant to a warrant based on probable
cause, there "is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancingthe need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the
20. See Bookspan, supra note 17, at 476 (stating a judicial shift from the application of the
probable cause requirement to a standard based on common sense debilitates the Fourth Amendment
and arguing that the courts have "sacrificed the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures for a chameleon-like 'reasonableness' approach"). Criticism of the Court's
willingness to make exceptions to the warrant requirement is not limited to academics. Justices
Marshall and Brennan called the Court to task for doing just that in their dissent in Skinner. Skinner,
489 U.S. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Mhe Court has eclipsed the probable-cause requirement
in a patchwork quilt of settings ....").
21. This Comment argues that the Court should acknowledge the fact that it applies a
reasonableness standard along with, and not as a subcategory of, the probable cause standard.
22. 392 U.S. 1(1968).
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
24. See Cloud, supra note 10, at 231.
25. Christine A. Atkinson, Note, Mandatory Drug Testing in the Public Work Sector: Erosion
of Fourth Amendment Protections, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 293, 306 (1991).
26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
27. Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The Court, in the context of an
administrative search, defined reasonableness as the balance between the need to search and the
invasion the search entails. Id. at 537. In the context of a criminal search, reasonableness is aptly
defined as "balanc[ing] the strength of an individual's privacy right against the strength of
recognized government interests when the two interests clashed." Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs
Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 94-95
(1992) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 9). In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court stated that "[w]here a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not
hesitated to adopt such a standard." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). In addition, a
balancing test of sorts was applied before Camara in a criminal case. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 768 (1966). The Court held that evidence of blood alcohol level obtained without a
warrant was admissible because: 1) the police had probable cause to believe the suspect was
inebriated, and 2) blood tests are minimally intrusive upon privacy interests. Id. at 768-72.
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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search (or seizure) entails." By establishing a Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness standard as applied in a balancing test, the Court acknowl-
edged that the amendment could be read in a way which severs the link
between reasonableness and probable cause."
The Fourth Amendment consists of two independent clauses, the
first declaring the right of the people to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, the second prohibiting the issuance of warrants
without probable cause.' These clauses represent logically, as well as
grammatically, distinct rights and prohibitions. Academicians have hotly
debated whether they are to be read together, so that a warrant based on
probable cause becomes the requisite for a reasonable search (the con-
junctive theory), or separately, making a reasonable warrantless search
constitutionally sound (the disjunctive theory)." A recent, exhaustive
analysis of the origins of the Fourth Amendment suggests that the Fram-
ers intended to link the concept of a reasonable search with a valid war-
rant, giving contemporary conjunctive theorists new support grounded in
historical precedent.33 Conjunctive theorists have severely criticized the
Court for betraying the intentions of the Framers and eviscerating the
Fourth Amendment.3" Despite the criticism, the Court has adopted the
29. Id. at 20-21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-37).
30. See id. at 19.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 1.
32. Academicians have hotly debated the merits of the "conjunctive" and "disjunctive"
theories of interpretation of Fourth Amendment interpretation for most of this century. The
"conjunctive" theorists have dominated. Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for
History, 63 U. Cfu. L. REv. 1707, 1721-22 (1996) (reviewing William John Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont
Graduate School) (on file with UMI Dissertation Services)).
33. Id. at 1723-24. The conjunctive interpretation is prominent in Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Vernonia, in which she frequently refers to Cuddihy's work. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397-2404 (1995). Justice O'Connor's dissent, based on the principle that
constitutional searches require individualized suspicion, departs from her position in previous cases
in which she joined the majority in upholding the legality of suspicionless searches. Cloud, supra
note 32, at 1711. See infra notes 78, 80, and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 10, at 200-01 (positing that the state of Fourth Amendment
search and seizure law is chaotic); Nuger, supra note 27, at 134 (concluding that the Supreme Court
has taken the Fourth Amendment "perilously close to incomprehensible disarray"); Michael S.
Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal Justice: An Evolving Exception to
the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.
J. 203 (1993) (stating that since 1985 the Supreme Court has emaciated the Fourth Amendment
requirements for probable cause); Atkinson, supra note 25, at 312-13 (arguing that Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable government intrusion has become almost a "historical
artifact"); William R. Hodkin, Comment, Rethinking Skinner and Von Raab: Reasonableness
Requires Individualized Suspicion for Employee Drug Testing, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 129, 156 (1991)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment has "lost all meaning because its application is unpredictable");
Jennifer L. Malin, Comment, Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Further Erosion of the
Fourth Amendment, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 469, 517 (1996) (concluding that failure to require
individualized suspicion erodes Fourth Amendment principles); Padilla, supra note 2, at 571
(alleging that the government broke the law by infringing Fourth Amendment rights of student
athletes).
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disjunctive approach as its operative approach to Fourth Amendment
interpretation."
B. Criticism of the Reasonableness Standard
Critics have put forward many reasons why a reasonableness stan-
dard, divorced from a probable cause standard and the warrant require-
ment, fails to protect Fourth Amendment freedoms. For instance, such a
standard has been criticized as being too broad and lacking objectivity. 6
Critics contend that because the definition of reasonableness lacks preci-
sion, judges may apply it according to their idiosyncratic inclinations,
and so apply the law unequally." In particular, critics disapprove of the
standard as the Court applies it through the balancing test announced in
Terry. Some argue that where a federal court employs a balancing test
instead of a reasonableness standard governmental interest will inevita-
bly prevail over individual liberties." If this is true, judicial application of
the balancing test becomes a serious threat to individuals' rights.39 An-
other criticism of balancing is that courts weigh social values rather than
apply constant legal principles and so inappropriately politicize the judi-
cial process. ' Critics also point out that the results of the balancing test
offer lower courts no generally applicable guidance because the test ap-
plies very specifically to issues and cases."
The Court continues to apply a disjunctive Fourth Amendment ap-
proach with no sign of retreat. Apparently, the Court does not fear that its
approach to a reasonableness standard threatens freedom and liberty as
35. See Bookspan, supra note 17, at 479 (stating that although the Court maintains that the
warrant requirement is normative, it has "circumvented" the requirement by creating new exceptions
or "shifting the inquiry to the reasonableness of the search or seizure").
36. See Nuger, supra note 27, at 120.
37. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J.
943, 973 (1987) (noting that even Roscoe Pound, the pragmatist, after a life's work could produce no
mathematically-based, scientific method of balancing competing interests); Bookspan, supra note
17, at 511 (vehemently condemning a reasonableness standard, and pointing out that in a balancing
test, what is reasonable in one judge's opinion may be unreasonable to another); Cloud, supra note
32, at 1723 ("Freed from the constraints of the Warrant Clause, judges applying the increasingly
malleable standard of reasonableness can adopt whatever policies they prefer."); Nuger, supra note
27, at 120 (arguing that with no objective methodology, the special needs rational results in an
uneven application of law because individual judges are free to weigh competing interests at will).
38. See Atkinson, supra note 25, at 307.
39. Id.; see also Nuger, supra note 27, at 120 (contending that current Fourth Amendment
analysis favors the government).
40. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that when "the question comes down to whether a particular search has been
'reasonable,' the answer depends largely upon the social necessity that prompts the search").
41. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1183-94 (1988)
(offering a detailed critique of the shortcomings of the balancing test including its lack of judicial
guidance); Vaughn & Carmen, supra note 34, at 216 ("[The 'special needs' exception relies on a
case-by-case balancing of individual and governmental interests, resulting in a legal doctrine that is
bereft of a definitional conceptual framework for lower courts to follow.").
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some contend it does. '2 Indeed, the Court has been willing to expand the
reach of Fourth Amendment reasonableness to include searches which
require no level of individualized suspicion whatsoever. 3 The Court has
been particularly willing to find that suspicionless urine drug testing of
certain classes of employees is within the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness standard."
C. Suspicionless Drug Testing: Pushing the Limits of Fourth Amend-
ment Protection
Prior to 1989, the Court recognized the requirement for minimal
individualized suspicion as the basis for most warrantless searches. For
example, the Court approved of a warrantless search of a probationer's
home where the search was based on a tip to police that the probationer
had violated the terms of his probation. ' Even in cases in which the
Court applied a reasonable suspicion standard, it required individualized
suspicion as a prerequisite to any legal search, at least in those cases in-
volving searches of persons not involved in closely regulated businesses,
or where the search was minimally intrusive.'
The Court changed its stance in a series of three cases beginning in
1989, in which the Court applied the reasonableness balancing test to
situations involving urine testing for the use of illegal drugs. '7 In these
cases, it allowed testing without requiring individualized suspicion of
drug abuse. In each of them, the Court found government-mandated drug
tests to be legal on grounds that government needs outweighed the pri-
vacy interests of the persons to be tested.
42. See supra note 34.0isting allegations of harm to Fourth Amendment protections due to
application of a reasonableness standard).
43. See supra note 5 (listing cases in which the Court upheld random suspicionless searches).
44. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989).
45. Atkinson, supra note 25, at 306 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(discussing search of probationer's home after police were given tip that the probationer possessed
firearms)).
46. Id. Atkinson states that the government was required to "demonstrate some individualized
suspicion." Id. However, such individualized suspicion appears not to have been applicable to
operators of "pervasively regulated businesses," who may have been subject for some time to
suspicionless searches. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,702 (1987) (listing three criteria for
warrantless searches of pervasively regulated businesses, none of which requires individualized
suspicion: 1) a substantial government interest in regulating the business, 2) the necessity of the
searches to further a "regulatory scheme," and 3) the searching of businesses with such certainty and
regularity so as to give notice and limit the discretion of inspecting officers).
47. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (involving junior high and high
school athletes); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (involving railroad workers in private industry); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (involving United States Customs
Service employees who carry firearms or handle sensitive information).
19971
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Association'
In Skinner, railroad employees filed suit to stop a drug testing pro-
gram promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) after
the FRA determined that industry safeguards against drug abuse by rail-
road employees were inadequate. '9 The Court found that urine drug test-
ing is a search under the Fourth Amendment."° It noted that a urine drug
test is no more intrusive than a general physical examination if the test is
administered in an environment similar to a general physical examination
and without a person monitoring the act of urination.' The Court con-
cluded that a urine drug test is not unconstitutionally intrusive to em-
ployees who are required to undergo physical examinations as a require-
ment for employment because those employees have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy." The majority balanced the employees' privacy
interests with the government's "compelling" need to ensure railroad
safety. 3 It concluded that the government's ability to promote safety
would be unreasonably hindered if it were required to test workers only
in cases of individualized suspicion."' Finally, the Court evaluated the
testing regime for its efficacy, finding that it was an effective method of
screening workers for drug use."
Justice Marshall dissented, warning that although drug abuse is a
hazard to society, impinging on constitutional rights to counter the haz-
ard poses a greater danger.' He decried the "incursion" of the balancing
test "into the core protections of the Fourth Amendment," 7 criticizing the
malleability of balancing. 8 Marshall faulted the Court for not requiring a
warrant for the testing or a showing that it "was based on probable cause
or... on lesser suspicion because it was minimally invasive."'59 In short,
the dissent argued that drug testing without at least a minimal level of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is unconstitutional.
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von RaabV°
In Von Raab, employees of the United States Customs Service
challenged the legality of a drug screening program for those transferring
48. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The plaintiff was Samuel K. Skinner, Secretary of Transportation. Id.
49. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607-08.
50. Id. at618.
51. Id. at 626-27.
52. Id. at 627.
53. Id. at 633.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 632.
56. Id. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. id. at 640.
58. Id. at 641.
59. Id. at 642.
60. 489 U.S. 656 (1989) The respondent in this case was William von Raab, Commissioner of
the United States Customs Service. Id.
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or seeking promotion to positions which involved work in drug interdic-
tion, the carrying of firearms, or the handling of classified materials.6'
The Court weighed the government's "compelling" interest in ensuring
that employees charged with drug interdiction have the requisite physi-
cal, moral, and intellectual attributes with the employees' privacy inter-
ests.62 It found in favor of the Customs Service, limiting its holding to
employees involved directly in drug interdiction and to employees who
handle firearms.63
Justice Marshall again dissented, stating that a balancing test was an
inappropriate Fourth Amendment analysis.' Justice Scalia also dissented,
but on the grounds that the government failed to prove that its interest
outweighed the privacy interests of Customs Service employees.65 In
Scalia's reading of the record, the government did not demonstrate a
problem of drug use among employees nor that any harm existed.' He
noted that he had joined the majority in Skinner because in that case the
government demonstrated the existence of drug use among the targeted
class of employees." Scalia dissented in Von Raab because he concluded
the government's proposed drug testing program did not respond to a
proven problem of abuse, but was instead "symbolic."
3. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton'
In Vernonia, decided six years after Skinner and Von Raab, the
Court held constitutional a school district's program of using urinalysis
to test student athletes for drug use.' Having noted that only those pri-
vacy interests which "society recognizes as 'legitimate"' are protected
under the Fourth Amendment," the Court found that schoolchildren who
have been temporarily committed to state custody have a lower expecta-
tion of liberty and privacy than do emancipated adults. 2 The Court then
concluded that the manner in which the testing was performed" and the
limited range of information the testing disclosed" made the testing proc-
61. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.
62. Id. at 670-71.
63. Id. at 677. The Court could not, based on the record, determine the reasonableness of
testing employees who handled classified materials. Id.
64. Id. at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 681.
67. Id. at 680.
68. Id. at 681.
69. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). The respondents in this case were Wayne Acton, a student in the
Vemonia school district, and his parents. Id.
70. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct at 2396.
71. Id. at 2391 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985)).
72. Id. at 2391-92.
73. Id. at 2393 (involving conditions similar to those the students were accustomed to
encountering in public restrooms in their schools).
74. Id. (involving a test narrowly designed to detect only drugs).
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ess relatively unobtrusive." The Court found in favor of the government
after balancing the children's low expectation of privacy with the gov-
ernment's "immediate" need to curb an "epidemic" of drug-related disci-
plinary problems.76
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court
reserved the question whether the school district could require all stu-
dents, not just those voluntarily participating in athletics, to undergo
urine drug testing.7 In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor criti-
cized the Court's acceptance of a suspicionless, blanket search, arguing
that the Framers foreclosed the constitutionality of such general searches
by requiring individualized suspicion and probable cause as the basis for
Fourth Amendment searches. " The dissent recognized the constitutional
validity of suspicionless searches in Skinner and Von Raab on the
grounds that individualized suspicion as a basis for drug testing was in-
feasible (because of the chaotic scene after a train wreck or the disruption
of the duties of Customs Service employees). Finally, O'Connor con-
cluded that the government's need to perform a blanket test did not out-
weigh the privacy interests of students because the same result could
have been achieved through testing individual students suspected of drug
use, rather than the entire class of athletes.'
The opinions in these three cases, majority and dissenting, reflect
the spectrum of support and criticism of a reasonableness standard ap-
plied through a balancing test. By balancing the interests of government
entities with an individual's expectation of privacy, the majority in each
case can claim that it responded affirmatively to society's need to curb
drug abuse while respecting Fourth Amendment rights. They applied a
reasonableness standard which, in their view, was consistent with a con-
junctive reading of the amendment because they applied it merely as an
exception to the warrant requirement." Justices Marshall and Brennan, in
their dissents in Skinner and Von Raab, criticized the majorities for what
amounted to an espousal of the disjunctive approach. They argued that
the Court's use of the reasonableness balancing approach was illegiti-
mate because a warrant is the "yardstick against which official searches
and seizures are to be measured" and anything less is unconstitutional. "2
Justice Scalia, in Von Raab, did not challenge the validity of the reason-
ableness standard or the practicability of a balancing test, but criticized
the Court's attempt to balance values. Thus, he maintained that where no
75. Id. at 2396.
76. Id. at 2395-96.
77. Id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2401.
80. Id. at 2403-04.
81. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
82. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 637 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359-60 (1985)).
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problem of drug abuse is shown, no need outweighs an individual's right
to privacy.83 Finally, Justice O'Connor relied on historical analysis to
reveal the Framers' intent as she argued for a conjunctive reading in her
dissent in Vernonia.
Chandler v. Miller8" is the fourth and latest in the line of cases in
which the Court analyzes the constitutionality of suspicionless drug
testing under a reasonableness standard and balancing test. In 1990, the
State of Georgia enacted legislation requiring that persons seeking cer-
tain state offices submit to a urine drug test to qualify for nomination or
election. 5 The law forbade any candidate who failed a drug test, or who
refused to take one, to stand for nomination or election.'
I. CHANDLER V. MILLER
A. Facts and Procedural History
In May, 1994, three members of the Libertarian Party declared their
candidacy for the offices of Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner of Ag-
riculture, and member of the State's House of Representatives." They
refused to submit to drug testing, and sued in federal court for declara-
tory and injunctive relief from Georgia's drug testing requirement on the
grounds that the law imposed a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.' The district court, rely-
ing upon Skinner and Von Raab, decided that the need of the State to
screen out drug-abusing officeholders balanced with the "relative unin-
trusiveness of the testing procedure" weighed in favor of the State's in-
terest. 9 Accordingly, the court declined to grant the plaintiffs' request for
preliminary injunction because the court found little likelihood the plain-
tiffs would prevail on their claim that the testing violated the Fourth
Amendment.'
83. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
84. 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
85. The statute lists those state offices for which a certificate of drug testing was required:
"Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent,
Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of the
Supreme Court, Judges of the Courts of Appeals, judges of the superior courts, district attorneys,
members of the General Assembly, and members of the Public Service Commission." GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-140(a)(4) (1993).
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-140(b) (1993).
87. Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1544 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
88. Chandler v. Miller, 952 F. Supp. 804, 805 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
89. Id. at 806.
90. Id. The court previously stated that a preliminary injunction would not be granted unless
the moving party clearly established, among other elements, that there was a "substantial likelihood"
that the moving party would prevail on the merits. Id. at 805.
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Subsequently, the candidates submitted to testing and their names
appeared on the ballot.9' After all three lost in the election, they moved
the district court for final judgment on their plea. The court entered
judgment in favor of the defendants." The plaintiffs appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit, claiming violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution." The court of appeals
affirmed in a two to one decision. Relying on the holdings of Skinner
and Von Raab, the Court found in favor of the State after balancing the
need to maintain the competency of high ranking officials and public
trust in them with the minimal intrusion drug testing imposed upon the
plaintiffs' privacy."
The dissent from the appeals court's decision reasoned that Geor-
gia's drug testing requirement violated Fourth Amendment protections
because the same result could be effectively obtained through ordinary
law enforcement means by requiring a warrant or individualized suspi-
cion.' The dissent distinguished Chandler from Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia.' As well, it contended that conditioning the holding of public
office upon submission to a drug test infringed upon the First Amend-
ment right to free speech of those who wished to challenge prevailing
drug policy.98 The petitioners appealed, inviting the United States Su-
preme Court to find that suspicionless searches of candidates for political
office violate the Fourth Amendment, and that Georgia's law was an
illegal restriction of the First Amendment right to free speech."
91. Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1299.
92. Id. Named defendants in the case were the Governor, Secretary of State, and
Commissioner of the Department of Human Resources of the State of Georgia. Chandler, 73 F.3d at
1543.
93. Chandler, 73 F.3d at 1545.
94. Id. at 1543
95. Id. at 1546-47. The court also held that the law did not infringe on candidates' Fourteenth
Amendment rights to run for office and the voters' Fourteenth Amendment rights to choose
candidates. Id. at 1547-48. Regarding petitioners' First Amendment claim, the court found that the
State's regulation of conduct implicating First Amendment free speech rights was legal. Id. at 1548-
49.
96. Id. at 1550 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1550-52. Judge Barkett pointed out that in this case, unlike in Skinner, no present
physical threat to the public existed nor was there evidence of a history of drug abuse among the
population to be tested. Id. at 1550-51. Unlike Von Raab, this case did not involve direct contact
between law enforcement officials and criminals, nor the duty of law enforcement officials to carry
firearms. Further, Judge Barkett noted, political candidates are not at risk for physical injuries on the
playing field as were the student athletes who abused drugs in Vernonia. Id. at 1551. Finally, he
stated, Chandler is distinguishable from these cases because it involves the right to participate in
government, a constitutionally protect right. Id. at 1552.
98. Id. at 1552.
99. Brief for Petitioners at i, Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997) (No. 96-126).
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B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg,"'° held that Geor-
gia's drug testing requirement for candidates for state offices violated
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search."' The Court
also found that government-ordered urine drug testing constituted a
search under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,"'° and that the
Tenth Amendment did not require the Court to relax the reasonableness
standard in deference to Georgia's sovereign right to establish qualifica-
tions for its officers. 3 The Court declined to address petitioners' First
Amendment claims."'
The Court began its analysis by reiterating that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that a search be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. The Court declared, however, that it often exempts special
needs, those beyond the normal needs of law enforcement, from the con-
stitutional requirement. 5 The Court then applied the balancing test, first
examining the degree of intrusiveness the State's drug testing regime
would impose on candidates." It found that the State's method of test-
ing-producing a urine sample in the office of a private physician and
limiting dissemination of the test results to the candidate-was relatively
non-invasive."'°
The majority then addressed the question of the significance of the
State's interest and whether it was sufficiently important to outweigh a
personal privacy interest."'" They found it was not, for.three reasons.
First, the State provided no evidence of an immediate or concrete danger
which the State intended the drug testing regime to address, such as a
drug abuse problem among elected state officials."" Though not a prereq-
uisite for a finding of legitimate special need, a demonstrable problem
would have supported the State's position that candidates seeking office
should submit to urine testing."' The Court noted that although it held
suspicionless drug testing to be legal in Von Raab despite a lack of evi-
100. Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1298. Joining in the opinion were Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer. Id.
101. Id. at 1305.
102. Id. at 1300.
103. Id. at 1302-03.
104. Id. at 1300 n.1.
105. Id. at 1301.
106. Id. at 1303.
107. Id. The Court noted that the drug testing guidelines adopted by the State of Georgia for its
candidates were substantially similar to those the Court accepted as relatively unintrusive in Skinner
and Von Raab.
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dence of actual drug usage among the test target population, it cautioned
that Von Raab "must be read in its unique context.""' The Court distin-
guished Chandler by pointing out that Von Raab involved direct contact
by United States Customs Service agents with drugs, drug dealers, and
firearms, as well as the inability of the Service to subject agents to daily
scrutiny." 2 The Court pointed out that none of these conditions existed in
regard to candidates for political office in Georgia."3
Second, the Court noted that the testing regime applied by Georgia's
statute would be ineffective in detecting drug use."' Because the testing
date could be scheduled by a candidate up to 30 days in advance, he or
she could easily elude detection by abstaining from drug use during that
time." In response to the State's contention that a true addict would be
unlikely to abstain and so would be detected, the Court pointed out that
the State had offered no evidence to show that such persons were likely
to seek office."6
Third, the majority found that even if such persons were to seek
office, ordinary law enforcement means would likely be sufficient to
indict them."' Therefore, the Court held that the State's drug testing re-
quirement did not constitute a legitimate exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement because the goal the statute intended
to achieve could be accomplished by ordinary law enforcement means." 
89
The Court then distinguished the importance of "symbolic" need
from "special" need in the context of exempting searches from Fourth
Amendment protection."'9 It pointed out that the Court took pains in
Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia to explain why exemptions in those
cases rested on particular, practical, and "special" needs.'2" It also noted
that the holding in Von Raab did not turn on the argument that suspi-
cionless drug testing afforded the benefit of demonstrating a commitment
to law enforcement.' 2' The Court stated that the action of setting a good
example, or making a symbolic gesture to demonstrate a state's com-
mitment to fighting drug abuse, does not rise to the level necessary to
warrant a relaxation of constitutional standards protecting individuals
111. Id. at 1304.
112. Id. (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Court contrasted the effectiveness of Georgia's testing regime with the regime the
Court approved in Von Raab. In Von Raab, the Court found that the program was effective in part
because the test target population "could not know precisely" when they would be tested. Id. at n.4.
116. Id. at 1304.
117. Id.
118. Id.





from government intrusion.'22 Quoting Justice Brandeis,"' it concluded
that well-meant symbolism is not sufficient reason to exempt a search
from Fourth Amendment protection.'
Finally, the majority made clear their decision did not touch the
issue of a state's requirement of general health screening and financial
disclosures for candidates, or the issue of private sector drug testing.' '
The Court reiterated the constitutionality of suspicionless searches where
there exists a "substantial and real" danger to public safety, but cautioned
that unless public safety is so threatened the Court would not exempt
suspicionless searches from constitutional protection."
2. Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority's opinion, ar-
guing in favor of the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Georgia
statute under the precedents set in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia."
7
The Chief Justice stated that the Court should determine whether a gov-
ernmental need to search which goes beyond the normal needs of law
enforcement is reasonable and constitutional on the basis of whether it
fulfills a proper governmental purpose, not on the basis of its
importance."8 Only after the Court determines that special need exists
should it apply a test balancing government interests with individual's
privacy interests." At that point, the Court should assess the importance
of the government's interest."' The Chief Justice criticized the majority
for improperly deciding that the State's need for drug testing was not
sufficiently important to exempt it from Fourth Amendment protection.''
He suggested that, in prior cases, governmental needs for searches which
the Court found to be legitimate exceptions to Fourth Amendment pro-
tection could not all be classified as greatly important.'3'
The Chief Justice contended that Georgia had a reasonable interest
in implementing a "prophylactic mechanism" to prevent drug users from
attaining high state office.'3' He relied on Von Raab, pointing out that the
122. Id.
123. "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding." Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479




127. Id. at 1306-07 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1306.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1306-07.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1306 (offering as examples the "supervision of probationers" and the "operation of a
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Court in that case held that a drug testing program was constitutional
even though it was implemented in response to the "pervasive social
problem" of drug abuse, not a proven drug problem among the test target
population.'34 He said that the State should not have to wait until a drug
addict or illegal drug user achieved elected office to protect its interest. '
After arguing that Georgia's drug testing regime represented a le-
gitimate government need, the dissent applied the balancing test, weigh-
ing the State's interest with the candidates' privacy interests. The Chief
Justice criticized the majority's conclusion that candidates are under such
a high level of scrutiny that drug testing is unnecessary to screen them
for illicit drug use.'36 He called the Court's decision a "strange holding"
in light of the fact that the railroad employees in Skinner and customs
officials in Von Raab were under the same type of scrutiny from supervi-
sors and fellow employees as are elected state officials.'37 In addition, he
pointed out, the method of testing in this case posed little invasion of
privacy because it could be conducted in the office of a candidate's own
physician.3 He disagreed with the majority's conclusion that because a
candidate could schedule the test in advance, a candidate who used drugs
would have sufficient time to abstain from drug use to pass the test.'39
The dissent then revisited Von Raab. It compared the handling of
classified materials by Customs Service agents, a function which the Von
Raab Court found was sufficiently significant to warrant suspicionless
drug searches,'" with state executive officers handling sensitive materi-
als.'' It argued that state officials who abuse drugs pose as much risk as
do Customs Service agents who abuse drugs.' 2 In sum, the dissent con-
cluded that because Georgia had a reasonable need to test its candidates
for drug use, and that such testing was minimally intrusive into candi-
dates' privacy, the State's candidate testing requirement was a special
need which should have been exempted from Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.' 3
134. Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673-74
(1989)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1306-07.
137. Id. at 1307.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Though the Court in Von Raab did state that Customs Service employees who sought
promotion to positions in which they handled sensitive information might be tested for drug use, the
Court held that the record of the case was too ambiguous to justify a finding that the class of
employees should be tested. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677-
78 (1989).
141. Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1307.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1306-07.
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Finally, the dissent questioned the majority's conclusion that a
state's right to test a candidate's general health differs so much from
urine drug testing that the former is legal, while the latter is not.'" Such a
policy judgment, the Chief Justice stated, is appropriately left to legisla-
tures. 45
III. ANALYSIS
The holding of Chandler may on its face be counted a victory
among those who have criticized the courts for whittling away at Fourth
Amendment protection. The case represents a halt, at least temporarily,
to the expansion of the legality of suspicionless searches. The Chandler
Court's disjunctive analysis of the amendment, however, severely tem-
pers any solace those critics may take in the Court's decision. The Chan-
dler Court does nothing to dismantle the framework which has served as
the basis for ever broader applications of the reasonableness standard.
That none of the Chandler majority chose to question or critique the rea-
sonableness standard indicates that the Court has no intention of revers-
ing its de facto application of a disjunctive approach. Indeed, the lone
dissenter argues for an even broader application of the reasonableness
standard.'4
Chandler is a tacit declaration that the Court is not going to heed the
advice of academicians and return to a conjunctive application of the
Fourth Amendment.'47 This Comment proposes that the Court correctly
refuses to turn back. It argues that a disjunctive reading of the Fourth
144. Id. at 1307.
145. Id. at 1308.
146. See id. at 1306-08. Because the holding in Chandler limits the expansion of the
reasonableness standard, it is logical that any Justice critical of the standard would not choose to
dissent from the decision. However, it is interesting to note that in cases in which the standard was
applied and resulted in an outcome favorable to the government, at least one Justice criticized the
balancing test or the way in which it was applied. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.
Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's acceptance of the
constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
462-63 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that notice should be a prerequisite to a warrantless
search); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 653-54 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that suspicionless drug testing is an inappropriate response to an emergency
situation); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 683-84 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that without a demonstrated history of drug abuse among the class to be
tested, a suspicionless drug testing regime is unconstitutional); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
718 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for allowing a search of a business in an
industry which was not closely regulated); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732-33 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for an unwarranted application of the balancing
test upon an incorrect finding of special need).
147. Professor Aleinikoff wrote in 1987 that "academia [had] fashioned a truce" regarding the
balancing test as the Court applied it to "area after area in constitutional law," with the result that
debate over the balancing had practically ceased. Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 944. More recently,
however, that truce seems to have been shattered. See, e.g., supra note 34 (listing a number of
authors who see the Fourth Amendment balancing test as a threat to Fourth Amendment
protections).
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Amendment is a legitimate basis for constitutional adaptation to situa-
tions and trends never contemplated in the world of the Framers, such as
the pervasive problem of drug abuse. It contends that the call for judicial
return to conjunctive analysis often reflects a mourning of the demise of
Lochner-era jurisprudence,'" a philosophy of law which dressed up judi-
cial tradition and paraded it as objective and immutable, untouchable by
the changing needs of the nation and its evolving society. Whether rejec-
tion of this fallacious viewpoint is labeled "Legal Realism" or something
else, 9 it recognizes that constitutional freedoms are not guaranteed by
judicial conformation to some Platonic legal form.'"
The following section briefly describes two suggestions to "sal-
vage" the reasonableness balancing test, and then addresses the argument
of some academicians that the courts should abandon the application of a
reasonableness standard in favor of a warrant requirement. That argu-
ment is analyzed in the framework of Lochner era formalist philosophy.
Finally, this section offers a pragmatist defense for the development of a
reasonableness standard, and proposes a two-tiered application of the
Fourth Amendment which preserves the traditional protections afforded
by the warrant requirement in criminal contexts while allowing the courts
to adapt constitutional principles to changing societal needs.
A. Suggestions to Fix the Reasonableness Balancing Test
Some critics of the Fourth Amendment balancing test concede,
grudgingly, that the Court is not going to abandon it in the foreseeable
future, and so have offered suggestions to save it from fatal subjectivity.
One proposal urges the addition of a "least intrusive alternative" analysis
to the test, not as the final measure of constitutional sufficiency, but as a
sufficient condition of constitutionality.'5 ' Put in very broad terms, this
four-fold recommendation would, first, require the state to adopt any
measure that is significantly less intrusive than the one being
challenged.' 2 Second, the state would be obligated to adopt the least in-
trusive measure reasonably available.'53 Third, the state would have to
148. It is important to distinguish between the call for a return to a conjunctive regime on the
grounds that the warrant requirement is the only correct Fourth Amendment interpretation and the
argument that the warrant requirement is the only practical alternative to flaws inherent in a
reasonableness balancing test. The first argument is essentially formalist and philosophical, the
second is pragmatist and empirical. Though the outcome proposed by both arguments is the same,
the framework underlying them is radically different. See infra notes 180, 185, and accompanying
text.
149. Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 963. Aleinikoff posits that the development of the Fourth
Amendment balancing process was not simply a Legal Realist reaction to Lochnerism, but to the
nihilistic, relativistic extremes of Legal Realism itself. Id.
150. Plato posited that ideas and concepts exist as "forms" that are immutable, timeless, and
subject to human discovery. 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 332 (1967).
151. Strossen, supra note 41, at 1257.
152. Id. at 1254.
153. Id. at 1255.
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make a prima facie showing that the measure it adopted was the least
intrusive option among those which would reasonably advance the
state's goals."" Fourth, consideration of the costs of a particular alterna-
tive measure would be irrelevant unless the costs were great enough to
make the alternative practically impossible.'" Adoption by courts of the
least intrusive search or seizure measure, the theory holds, would help
protect personal privacy and liberty which is threatened when courts bal-
ance governmental and private interests.
Another proposal would abandon altogether the attempt to establish
generally applicable standards for a balancing test in favor of an absolute
case-by-case determination of reasonableness under the circumstances of
a particular search or seizure.'" Trial courts would be the locus of such
determinations.' The rationale for this approach is that any attempt to
distill rules from cases in which a court employed the reasonableness
balancing test is futile.'!" One suggested advantage of this approach is
that it would eliminate the need for appeals courts to craft precedents
defining reasonableness and would "extract the Court from the tarbaby of
Fourth Amendment law.
'' 59
Neither of these proposals suggests that the Court should retain the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing test. Instead, they are
founded on the notion that if the Court must insist on using the test, it
should find a way to do so that is minimally destructive of Fourth
Amendment rights.
Several other critics are more straightforward in contending that any
reasonableness standard, certainly including a balancing test, is simply
too flawed to be a workable guarantor of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tections of liberty, privacy and property."w They argue that a reasonable-
ness standard, separated from the requirement for warrants issued on the
basis of probable cause, should be abandoned altogether with only rare
exceptions.'6 ' Whether arguing for a modification of the reasonableness
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1256.
156. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MicH. L. REV. 1468, 1480
(1985). Professor Bradley offers two models aimed at reforming the Court's Fourth Amendment
analysis. Model I proposes abandoning current Fourth Amendment analysis which Bradley says
results in "incomprehensible rules" in favor of a case-by-case reasonableness analysis. Id at 1491.
Model U takes the opposite approach, proposing abandonment of the reasonableness standard
altogether in favor of a strict warrant requirement. Id. An emergency which absolutely prevents a
law enforcement officer from obtaining a warrant would be the only exception to the requirement.
Id. at 1492. Bradley applies the two models specifically to search and seizure by law enforcement
agencies. Id. at 1471.
157. Id. at 1488.
158. Id. at 1491.
159. Id. at 1488.
160. See supra note 34.
161. See Bookspan, supra note 17, at 529 (stating that the Court should eliminate all exceptions
to the warrant requirement other than exceptions for exigent circumstances); Cloud, supra note 10, at
19971
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balancing test or writing it off completely, criticism is misguided when it
calls for application of a conjunctive reading of the amendment on the
grounds that objective standards lie beyond the reach of shifting policy
concerns. At its core, this reasoning is an assumption of mistaken philo-
sophical first principles. Such principles find expression in Lochner era
formalism.'62
B. The Philosophical Foundation of Lochner Era Formalism
The Lochner era of Fourth Amendment interpretation was devel-
oped in a line of cases beginning with Boyd v. United States' 63 and in-
cluding Lochner v. New York.'" It extended from the latter quarter of the
nineteenth century through the first third of the twentieth. The Lochner
era's decline is highlighted in the Court's decision in Olmstead v. United
States'5 in 1928. In that case, the Court held that evidence of criminal
activity was admissible in court even though it had been obtained
through wiretaps of telephone conversations, without the knowledge or
consent of the interlocutors.'" The Court reasoned that because law en-
forcement officials committed no physical trespass and made no seizure
of physical property, the Fourth Amendment did not protect those
224 (arguing that warrants are rooted in a rule-based model which provides objective tests against
which the constitutionality of a search can be judged); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment
During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv.
555 (1996) (advocating a return to theories embraced in the Lochner era and a re-dedication to the
Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause); Malin, supra note 34, at 488 (contending that individualized
suspicion "effectively curtails governmental discretion and arbitrary searches").
162. This is not to say, of course, that everyone who advocates a return to a conjunctive reading
of the Fourth Amendment espouses a Lochner era philosophy. For instance, Professor Bradley
suggests a return to a strict warrant requirement as a practical solution to the problems he believes
are inherent in the current state of Fourth Amendment analysis. Bradley, supra note 156, at 1472.
Nowhere in his article does Professor Bradley argue for the conjunctive theory. Rather, his approach
is essentially pragmatist.
163. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that a subpoena to produce an invoice, in a civil suit by the
United States against an importer of merchandise, violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable search and seizure).
164. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is not a Fourth Amendment case. It involved the right to
contract. The Court held that government-imposed rules limiting bakers to a 60-hour work week
were an unconstitutional limitation on the freedom to contract. The case stands as an icon for a legal
era which is often characterized as one in which the individualism of capitalist, laissez-faire
economics prevailed. For a critique of that characterization, see Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era
Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991) (explaining
how the Lochner era decisions are related to jurisprudential trends before and after that period in
history). See also Cloud, supra note 161, at 601 n.216. (contending that Lochner era formalism was
designed to promote individual liberty rather than to address economic issues).
165. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
166. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
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charged in the case.67 It held that Fourth Amendment protections ex-
tended only to "material things.'"
On its face, Olmstead appears to be yet another property-law based
Fourth Amendment decision. However, the Court's application of prop-
erty-based principles was so narrow that in effect it excluded a virtual
world of human interaction from Fourth Amendment protection, includ-
ing the expanding world of electronic communication. In Olmstead, the
Court decided that a person could not expect his or her constitutionally
protected privacy to extend beyond spatially limited entities, such as a
home or written communication on paper." New relationships between
the government and an individual citizen promoted by technological ad-
vances and a burgeoning population would outstrip the Court's willing-
ness to extend them traditional search and seizure protections.
Though the Court's holding in Olmstead did not divorce Fourth
Amendment analysis from its Lochner era marriage to property rights, it
signaled the beginning of an era in which the relationship would become
more and more tenuous, and would ultimately break down.' That time
was presaged by no less a commanding figure than Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, who wrote in his dissent in Olmstead that "[w]e must
first consider the two objects of desire both of which we cannot have and
make up our minds which to choose."'7 ' Holmes' framing of the issue in
terms of choice, Professor Morgan Cloud suggests, was a declaration that
"[v]alue choices, not deductive application of rules, should control the
outcome.""' 2
The replacement of "deductive application of rules" with "value
choices" in a post-Lochner era lies at the heart of much of the criticism
of a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. Professor Cloud em-
167. Id.
168. Id. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the majority interpreted the amendment's
use of the words "persons, houses, papers, and effects" too literally, and that the Constitution applies
not merely to "what has been," but also to "what may be." Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Holmes, also dissenting, stated the principle that the Court is free to choose between policies, but
that in this case, if the Court confined itself to "precedent and logic," the result must be to conclude
that the government's wiretap was illegal. Id. at 471 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 465. Cloud contends that the Framers intended written communication, a person's
"papers," to be the primary areas afforded protection from unreasonable search and seizure. See
Cloud, supra note 161, at 523, 622.
170. That break is epitomized by the Court's declaration in Katz that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
171. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In addition, Holmes' predilection for
applying social policy considerations to constitutional analysis is evident in his dissent in Lochner,
in which he wrote, "general propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise." Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
172. Cloud, supra note 161, at614.
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ploys the categories "formalist"' 73 and "pragmatist""'7 to describe the dif-
ferences in these two approaches. The former is characterized by an ob-
jective, rule-based analysis, the latter by an intuitive, goal-oriented reac-
tion to a fact situation."5 The Lochner era's warrant-based approach is
essentially formalist,'76 while the current era of disjunction between a
reasonableness standard and a probable cause standard reflects a prag-
matist stance. The critics charge that, cut loose from "objective" moor-
ings, constitutional theory. will be tossed about in the storms of social
change and political exigency.'" They argue that the bulwark of Fourth
Amendment protection from governmental search and seizure, and in-
deed the protections of all freedoms embodied in the constitution, will
erode in the face of "subjective" pressures brought about by time and
circumstance. 8 As evidence, the critics may point to the fact that in a
post-Lochner era it is perfectly legal for the government to subject citi-
zens to a search in the form of a urine drug test without suspicion of
wrongdoing."9 For some, the fact that whole classes of citizens can be
legally subjected to searches without even a degree of individual suspi-
cion may be evidence enough to conclude that the rights afforded by the
Constitution are in peril from competing values, such as those embodied
in a "war" on drugs.
There is a complex framework to the conclusion that "subjectivist"
and "pragmatist" forces are at work to undermine constitutional protec-
tions. That framework is essentially philosophical. Professor Cloud tac-
itly acknowledges the philosophical framework behind formalist, objec-
tivist critiques of contemporary applications of the Fourth Amendment
by noting that formalist theory relies heavily on the concept of natural
law and natural rights.'" Such formalism embraces a Karitian view that
law and ethics is non-empirical, believing that legal principles exist apart
173. Id. at 565. The attributes of nineteenth century formalism include deductive application of
identified legal rules. The rules derive from an "existing corpus" of sources and natural law. Id. at
565-66.
174. Id. at 598. Professor Aleinikoff provides a succinct history and description of legal
pragmatism. Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 956-58. He describes it as a "non-formalist mode of legal
reasoning attuned to the way in which law actually function[s] in society," noting that it narrows the
distinction of the role of the judiciary and the legislature. Id. at 957-58. Among the champions of
judicial pragmatism he mentions are Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone as well as
Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn. Id. at 954-56. Though closely associated with Llewellyn and
Legal Realism, judicial pragmatism is distinguishable from Legal Realism. Id. at 956-57.
175. See supra notes 158, 160, and accompanying text.
176. It is "essentially" formalist, because there are certain pragmatist characteristics in Lochner
era judicial reasoning. Cloud, supra note 161, at 625.
177. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. A drug testing requirement, such as the one Georgia sought to impose, "effects a search
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295,
1300 (1997).
180. Cloud, supra note 161, at 567.
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from and a priori to "fact-propositions" and are "absolute."'"' It is not
surprising, then, that Professor Cloud relates the formalist stance to
Christopher Columbus Langdell's view that "law is a science,"'82 and
states that effective legal analysis should not rely "upon goals or stan-
dards extrinsic to the law."'8 3 Nor is it remarkable that Professor Cloud's
description of formalism includes the notion that "legally authoritative
reason.., usually excludes from consideration, overrides, or at least
diminishes the weight of, any countervailing substantive reason arising at
the point of decision or action."'8" In the formalist, Kantian, Langdellian
world, law is to be discovered and deduced from unchangeable, natural
principles. According to Professor Cloud, these are the principles which
the Framers had in mind as they crafted the Constitution, and which un-
derlie Fourth Amendment theory.' 5
Accepting Professor Cloud's description of formalism's philosophi-
cal stance as the basis for Lochner era constitutional analysis," one can
see why critics of a post-Lochner, "pragmatist" approach to Fourth
Amendment interpretation distrust a method which applies an outcome-
based balancing test. In their eyes, any method which balances "values"
(a subjective process) in place of deducing conclusions from principles
without regard to the practical outcomes of a particular analysis (an ob-
jective process) cannot protect constitutional rights. Critics contend that
subjective, case-by-case analysis runs the risk of taking Fourth Amend-
ment analysis out of the realm of deductive, predictable results and
throws it open to the uncertain tides of politics and shifting social
goals.
8 7
The debate over the validity of a conjunctive as opposed to a dis-
junctive Fourth Amendment approach involves competing fundamental
philosophical viewpoints. If one rejects the philosophical first principle
that law exists unchanging and immutable, and accepts as a first principle
that law is a function of the circumstances of a changing world, then one
sees that a reasonableness standard applied in a balancing test does not
threaten constitutional freedoms and undermine the rule of law as a for-
malist may contend it does.'"
181. Id. at 568 n.48 (quoting EDWIN M. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE
LAW 472 (1953)).
182. Id. at 565 (citing Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 L. Q.
REV. 123, 124 (1887)).
183. Id. at 566.
184. Id. (quoting P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 246 (1987)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 567-68.
187. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
188. To say that law is a function of the circumstances of a changing world is different from
saying that law has no foundation in rules and precedent. The difference between formalist and
pragmatist positions is not necessarily that one applies strict rules and the other discounts rules. The
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Outside a formalist framework, the empirical nature of a reason-
ableness standard and a disjunctive reading of the Fourth Amendment,
separating reasonableness from probable cause, are not inherently threat-
ening. "Empirical" need not mean "relativist." "Subjective" need not
connote "absent principles." An empirical, pragmatist application of
Fourth Amendment protections can be a reasonable response to changing
circumstances, needs, and times. If law is dynamic and dialectic, rather
than static, then a reasonable balancing of values can offer a workable
framework within which law may evolve.
Of course, criticism of the reasonableness balancing test is not lim-
ited to formalists. A pragmatist may also contend that reasonableness
balancing lacks objectivity and that it is unacceptably idiosyncratic.'89
However, responses to concerns raised from a pragmatist framework
differ from responses to a formalist critique. The latter are ultimately
philosophical, the former are practical. A pragmatist response to the
problem of subjectivity in a reasonableness balancing test seeks to ensure
that courts thoroughly analyze the rationale they use in weighing com-
peting interests, and do not content themselves with balancing "inside a
black box.""w A pragmatist approach to Fourth Amendment balancing
recognizes that rules distill from individual circumstances in a dialectic
process.'9' For that dialectic to work, courts must be clear and conscien-
tious about articulating the reasoning they employ in balancing compet-
ing interests.'" If courts are disciplined in their reasoning, judicial ration-
relativist aspect of pragmatism is not absolutely relativist. It need not relegate law to the arena of
mere arbitrary choice. Rather, it recognizes the development of law as a dialectic process between
rules and fact situations. When those situations confront rules and principles, new rules may evolve
which retain the core principles of the original rules. The relationship between the original rules and
the evolving rules forms an objective basis for legal decision making. Over time law may transmute
itself into something different, but the core rules and principles can, and probably do, remain
essentially the same. Unlike the formalist, the pragmatist will likely acknowledge this relative
objectivity of law.
189. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 975. Aleinikoff argues that value balancing fails to
use a common scale, making the process essentially intuitive and subjective. Id. at 976. One need not
be a formalist to advance this and other practical criticisms of Fourth Amendment balancing.
Certainly not all critics of the current trend in Fourth Amendment analysis are proponents of
Lochner era legal reasoning, nor are they neo- or pseudo-Kantian. Such critics may argue that the
reasonableness test is simply impractical. See, e.g., supra note 162 (noting that Professor Bradley's
proposal to return to a strict warrant requirement is essentially pragmatist). As well, one may press a
conjunctive Fourth Amendment reading based on an historical analysis, arguing that the Framers
intended to identify reasonableness with a warrant requirement and therefore that the conjunctive
interpretation is the legitimate interpretation.
190. Aleinkoff, supra note 37.
191. See Cloud, supra note 10, at 233 (discussing the pragmatist approach to Fourth
Amendment analysis).
192. A good example of imprecision in applying a balancing test occurs in the Chandler
Court's use of the terms "substantial" and "important." Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1303
(1997). The Court does not define the terms or explain how the government's interest is any more or
less substantial or important than the plaintiffs'. The majority simply concludes that the State did not
justify the substantial need or importance of its interests vis-A-vis the interests of the plaintiffs. Id.
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ale will, over time, yield clear rules. This is a "messy" process, however,
that will never satisfy the formalist longing for deductive clarity.
C. A Pragmatist Proposal for Applying a Fourth Amendment Reason-
ableness Standard
Despite the many arguments against the use of a reasonableness
standard as applied through a balancing test, some scholars remain skep-
tical of the notion that a warrant requirement based on a probable cause
standard provides the only sure basis for protecting Fourth Amendment
rights.'93 Alternatives to the Lochner-era conjunctive reading of the
Fourth Amendment propose that a reasonableness standard can form the
basis for workable Fourth Amendment analysis regarding warrantless
searches.'94 The concepts of "reasonableness" and "constitutional reason-
ableness" are not necessarily exclusive.'95
Professor Akhil Reed Amar offers an interesting but ultimately im-
practical method of applying a standard of reasonableness to constitu-
tional law. He points out that the locus of "common sense reasonable-
ness" in the Anglo-American judicial system is the jury, but notes that
juries do not decide constitutional reasonableness.' The locus of consti-
tutional interpretation is the appellate courts." Can the two loci meet?
Professor Amar argues that they can, and should.'98 But the historical and
practical rationale for doing so is questionable.'" Constitutional decisions
have historically been decided by trained jurists, not juries.' Though
Amar contends that allowing juries to decide constitutional issues would
result in an effective application of a reasonableness standard and a con-
stitutionally literate citizenry,"' the specter of having jurors untrained in
the law handing down legally binding constitutional precedent is one the
For the Court to develop a workable reasonableness standard, it must carefully explain the criteria it
employs. The level of government need sufficient to pass muster in a balancing test has varied from
case to case. See id. (substantial and important); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,
2395 (compelling or important); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633
(1989) (compelling); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989)
(compelling); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (substantial).
193. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 801,
817 (1994) (stating that the Fourth Amendment should be based on "constitutional reasonableness"
rather than "probability or warrant").
194. Id. at 800.
195. Id. at 817.
196. Id. at 817-19 (advocating moving the decision making process regarding legitimacy of
Fourth Amendment searches into the arena of civil litigation).
197. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
198. Id. at 817
199. Cloud, supra note 32, at 1735-36 ("1 cannot readily discern the inseparable connection
between the existence of liberty and the trial by jury in civil cases."). Cloud relies on Cuddihy's
historical an lysis to critique Amar's conclusion that he Framers intended a disjunctive reading of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1710, 1742.
200. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
201. Amar, supra note 193, at 818-19.
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American legal system has never embraced, and for good reason. The
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence places the responsibility for
making findings of fact in the hands of jurors, while charging jurists with
the task of making findings of law.' 0 The system leaves the role of es-
tablishing legal precedents to those trained in the law. 3
Another approach applies the reasonableness standard to Fourth
Amendment analysis while preserving the protections afforded by a war-
rant-based regime. This way calls for the Court to recognize the distinc-
tion between searches and seizures in the criminal context and in an ad-
ministrative context, and apply the probable cause standard to the former
and a reasonableness standard to the latter.' Such a judicial adoption of
a disjunctive reading of the Amendment would result in a two-tier scale
for Fourth Amendment cases, which would yield several benefits.
First, it would help alleviate the threat that expanding application of
a reasonableness standard will allow law enforcement agencies to en-
croach more and more upon traditional constitutionally protected rights
in a criminal context. 5 Arguments in favor of preserving the warrant
requirement often focus on the criminal context of Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures, including the exclusionary rule of evidence,2"
202. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 7, 229 nn.29-30
(1985).
203. This is not to say, of course, that the people should not or do not ultimately control their
political destiny. Jurists create legal precedent, but the power to correct that precedent is vested in
the people through legislative representation and the right to amend the Constitution. See Aleinikoff,
supra note 37, at 960, 984 (discussing generally the court system and legislative function). Though
critics of legal pragmatism note that it brings judicial and legislative functions uncomfortably close,
nevertheless they remain logically and functionally separate. Id. at 958.
204. "Our cases teach... that the probable-cause standard is 'peculiarly related to criminal
investigations."' National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)
(quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)). Professor Amar points out, however, that
the Fourth Amendment makes no distinction between criminal and civil searches. Amar, supra note
193, at 770.
205. See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65
IND. L. J. 549, 554-55, (1990) (criticizing encroachment on Fourth Amendment protections largely
in the context of criminal cases); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions
Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REv. 49, 51 (1995) (focusing on law enforcement uses of
property and information obtained through a legal seizure). The proposed two-tier Fourth
Amendment application does not eliminate all concerns and criticisms regarding the expansion of
exceptions to the warrant requirement. It does not address the issue of whether warrantless searches
which bring the potential for criminal conviction (such as stop-and-frisk and DUI checkpoint
searches) should be curtailed. Rather, it is limited to those situations in which a search would have
non-criminal implications, such as affecting a person's employment status.
206. See Bookspan supra note 17, at 478 ("The evisceration of the warrant requirement and its
accompanying erosion of fourth amendment protections derive from judicial dislike of the
exclusionary rule."); Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 1079, 1082 (1995) (analyzing the intersection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the
context of informational privacy). The identification of the Fourth Amendment with criminal law,
and the exclusionary rule ird particular, can be traced to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Cloud, supra note 161, at 573. In Boyd, the Court interpreted the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
together, linking the two "by principles of privacy, property, and liberty." Id. at 576. Although the
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without distinguishing them from non-criminal contexts. ' Professor
Tracey Maclin notes that supporters of a warrant-based application of the
Fourth Amendment "argue that the rule is designed to promote the cen-
tral premise of the Fourth Amendment, which is to control police discre-
tion." Applying the stricter Fourth Amendment standard in criminal
cases would respect the difference between a search which results in the
possibility of imprisonment and a criminal record, and one which does
not. This distinction between standards applied in criminal and non-
criminal cases is analogous to a distinction already firmly rooted in
American jurisprudence, the use of separate standards of proof in crimi-
nal and civil actions.'
The second advantage is correlative to the first. Distinguishing
criminal from non-criminal contexts would free the Court to develop a
workable standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness without threat-
ening traditional applications of the warrant requirement in the criminal
context. The reasonableness standard is relatively new and immature. As
this Comment points out, criticisms of a reasonableness standard fre-
quently point to its vagueness and lack of definition."' They contend the
probable cause standard is arguably better because it is rule-based and
objective."' However, there is no internal logic in the warrant require-
exclusionary rule is the focus of much Fourth Amendment analysis, it does not apply to civil cases,
but is intended to exclude illegally obtained evidence from criminal proceedings. Russell W.
Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 737, 776 (1992).
207. Precedent exists for distinguishing Fourth Amendment standards in criminal and
administrative contexts. The Court has tended to apply a stricter standard in criminal cases, and the
Court has suggested that noncriminal cases are "peripherally" related to the Fourth Amendment.
Nuger, supra note 27, at 92. Professor Amar criticizes law schools for fostering the identification of
the Fourth Amendment with criminal law by teaching it by itself or in criminal procedure courses,
rather than in constitutional law classes where it would be put in the context of the Constitution as a
whole. Amar, supra note 193, at 758. Professor Cloud contends that isolating Fourth Amendment
analysis to the area of criminal law "impoverishe[s] both Fourth Amendment theory and general
constitutional theory alike." Cloud, supra note 10, at 200. See also Vaughn & Carmen, supra note
34, at 209 (criticizing the Court for confusing application of the special needs exemption from the
wan-ant requirement in administrative and criminal contexts).
208. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994). Maclin criticizes Amar's proposal to allow juries constitutional review of
searches and seizures in part on the grounds that it is an ineffective way of policing the police. Id. at
32.
209. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 271-72 (1986) (listing the three
accepted standards of proof as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a preponderance of evidence, and
clear and convincing evidence); California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater,
454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981) (stating that the Court has never required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
a civil case). The American system of jurisprudence recognizes that criminal prosecution brings with
it the potential of greater penalty than does a civil action, such that a higher burden of proof is
imposed in criminal actions. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 493-94 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(declaring that "[w]e permit proof by a preponderance of evidence in civil litigation because 'we
view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor
than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor"'and noting that "we do not take that
view in criminal cases") (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
210. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
211. Cloud, supra note 32, at 1728.
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ment or the probable cause standard that makes the warrant requirement
inherently more objective than a reasonableness standard.22 Rather, the
warrant requirement's established rules and standards appear more "ob-
jective" because they derive from over two centuries of case law which
defines its parameters."3 In contrast, thirty years have passed since Katz"'
was decided, and not even fifteen since T.L.O.2' Because the end of the
Lochner era is still relatively recent, and also because the Court has tried
to squeeze the reasonableness standard into exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the Court has not had sufficient opportunity to thoroughly
define the parameters of a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.
Given time, the appellate system can produce a constitutional standard of
reasonableness which will serve as precedent to lower courts and provide
standards for case-by-case analysis.
Third, distinguishing criminal from non-criminal Fourth Amend-
ment criteria would serve to adjust a glaring inequity in the Court's con-
temporary application of the amendment. Currently, searches which are
generally accepted and even lauded in the private sector,"6 such as certain
mandatory drug testing of employees, are subject to a much higher de-
gree of scrutiny when conducted by the government of its own employ-
ees."7 Certainly a general testing regime accepted in the private sector for
administrative purposes is not by its nature more onerous or more threat-
ening than a test administered under the same circumstances by the gov-
212. See Amar, supra note 193, at 770-71 (stating that the foundation of the Fourth Amendment
is reasonableness).
213. See generally Cloud, supra note 32, at 1714, 1725-26 (discussing the development of
search warrants).
214. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
215. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
216. Though many criticize the use of suspicionless drug testing in the private sector, there is
also broad support for it. Businesses may tend to support such testing because of effective results in
decreasing costs related to drug abuse, and there are indicators that many employees support work
place drug testing. See Scott S. Cairns & Carolyn V. Grady, Drug Testing in the Workplace: A
Reasoned Approach for Private Employers, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 491, 543 (1990) (stating
that a carefully implemented workplace drug testing regime can boost productivity and employee
morale); Stephen M. Fogel et al., Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 553, 560 n.23 (1988) (reporting that a 1986 national study showed two-thirds of workers
surveyed supported workplace drug testing, while another survey showed 47 percent of adults
surveyed supported testing); D. Garrison "Gary" Hill, The Needle and the Damage Done: The
Fourth Amendment, Substance Abuse and Drug Testing in the Public Sector, S.C. LAW., June 1997,
at 19 (noting that by 1990, half the Fortune 500 companies had instituted drug testing policies);
Shawn G. Twing, Drug & Alcohol Testing by Private Employers... and Its Relationship to
Workers' Compensation Practice in Arkansas, ARK. LAW., Fall 1996, at 31 (quoting a 1990 study
that employers report benefits of drug testing, and that employees register minimal resentment);
Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect American
Values?, 72 Ci.-KENT L. REv. 271, 274-75 (1996) (reporting a survey concluded in 1995 that a
large majority of employees supported urine drug testing). Support for random workplace drug
testing, however, is by no means universal. See, e.g., Patricia A. Montgomery, Workplace Drug
Testing: Are There Limits?, TENN. B. J., Apr. 1996, at 32 (listing states that have prohibited or
restricted random workplace drug testing).
217. Montgomery, supra note 216, at 21.
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emiment acting in the role of employer or administrator. Adoption of the
reasonableness standard for administrative searches would still subject
government-ordered searches to constitutionally-mandated judicial scru-
tiny, but not to the same degree as searches which might result in crimi-
nal penalties.
Finally, a two-tier approach to Fourth Amendment analysis would
alleviate a source of criticism and confusion in the existing analytical
system. Currently, the Court disingenuously maintains that a conjunctive
interpretation is the law of the land, even while carving out more and
more exceptions to the warrant requirement."8 The Court disserves itself
and opens itself up to much of the criticism it receives by proclaiming
one standard while straining to apply another. By clearly applying the
more stringent probable cause standard to criminal contexts and applying
the reasonableness standard without any pretense of a warrant require-
ment to administrative contexts, the Court would eliminate much confu-
sion and concern over the fate of the Fourth Amendment.
A disjunctive reading of the Fourth Amendment, applying a warrant
requirement based on probable cause to searches and seizures in a crimi-
nal context and a reasonableness standard to non-criminal, administrative
searches, preserves traditional curbs to police powers while allowing the
courts to meet situations and exigencies not anticipated by the Framers.
Such an approach respects the traditional role the warrant requirement
has played in protecting Fourth Amendment rights, while sidestepping
the erroneous tenet of Lochner era formalism which demands the appli-
cation of a probable cause standard in every situation which implicates
the Fourth Amendment. A two-tier Fourth Amendment analysis rejects
the philosophy which confuses "what has been" with "what always is
and ought to be." At the same time, distinguishing the standards applied
to criminal and non-criminal situations respects the pragmatist philo-
sophical principle that law can and should evolve to adapt to new de-
mands, rather than forcing new situations to fit the law. The time is ripe
for the Court to acknowledge its tacit disjunctive approach to the Fourth
Amendment by adopting a two-tier system which distinguishes criminal
from non-criminal application of Fourth Amendment protections.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chandler v. Miller
tacitly declares that the Court will not sanction all government-ordered
suspicionless drug testing. The Chandler ruling will probably come as a
relief to those who decry and fear that the Court has sapped the life blood
out of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search. Any
relief felt will be short lived. Chandler does nothing to reverse the
218. See Bookspan, supra note 17, at 529 (urging that the Court abandon "dishonest application
of the per se unreasonable" standard and condemning "the enigmatic post hoc reasonableness
evaluation currently in favor").
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Court's use of a reasonableness balancing test. That test, one of the
Court's critics contends, has left the Fourth Amendment not only anemic
but on the verge of death.2 ' Such criticism overstates, however, the prob-
ability of the imminent demise of Fourth Amendment rights.
From a pragmatist philosophical perspective, the Court's develop-
ment of the reasonableness balancing test is a legitimate response to exi-
gencies and situations not envisioned or contemplated by the Framers. It
reflects an appropriate disjunctive reading of the amendment, which al-
lows for a reasonableness standard to coexist with a probable cause stan-
dard for government-ordered searches and seizures. The reasonableness
standard lacks the definition and precision of the probable cause standard
in part because it has not had the time and opportunity to ripen and ma-
ture.
One approach the Court may take to advance the development of the
standard distinguishes its use in criminal and non-criminal contexts. Ap-
plying the probable cause standard, with its warrant requirement, in
criminal contexts will preserve traditional Fourth Amendment protec-
tions which critics of the reasonableness standard fear losing. Applying a
reasonableness standard in administrative contexts will allow the Court
to develop it free from strained, and disingenuous, connections to the
probable cause standard. This two-tier application of the standards set
out in the Fourth Amendment will allow the courts, over time and
through the dialectic process inherent in the evolution of common law, to
shape a reasonableness standard as they have the probable cause stan-
dard. Chandler is a step in that process.
Michael E. Brewer
219. Bookspan, supra note 17, at 474 (stating that it is premature to declare the Fourth
Amendment dead, but urging drastic action to save it). Professor Bookspan tempers her declaration,
however, by referring to Mark Twain's famous statement that "reports of [his] death have been
greatly exaggerated." Id. (quoting cable from London to Associated Press, 1897).
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